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Abstract 
The successful expansion of multiple retailing in interwar Britain is often seen to rest, 
in part, on the inculcation of efficient and uniform working practices throughout a 
company’s branch network. Major multiple retailers often placed considerable stress 
on codifying the standards expected of store managers and their staff; on creating 
systems of branch supervision and inspection by staff directly responsible to head 
office; and on the submission of frequent and detailed returns outlining the 
operational and financial performance of individual stores. In practice, however, this 
did not always lead to the degree of operational centralisation and uniformity which is 
sometimes assumed. Evidence from the Marks and Spencer Archive reveals not only 
the limitations of local compliance with officially sanctioned policies and processes, 
but also an expectation that managers would exercise positive discretion in 
implementing standards in a locally appropriate fashion. The paper thus sheds new 
light on the role of the multiple store manager – hitherto a somewhat neglected figure 
– in the retail evolution of the interwar years. 
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Introduction: scale, management and the interwar advance of multiple retailing 
Some of the most frequently cited studies of the distributive sector in interwar Britain 
focus on the rise of multiple retailing.1 This was a phenomenon which prompted 
much debate amongst contemporaries exercised by its implications, perceived to be 
social as well as commercial; and which has attracted the subsequent interest of 
economists and historians.2 Although the years before 1914 had seen the 
emergence of several hundred retailers operating chains of ten or more stores as a 
single business, multiple retailing gained in significance during the 1920s and 1930s 
as its outgrew its origins as a means of selling a limited range of mass-produced 
staple goods to poorer consumers. The proportion of total retail trade conducted 
through chain stores rose from no more than 10 per cent in 1920 to nearly 20 per 
cent by 1939. Growth was thus driven not only by rising consumer spending, but also 
by sales gains at the expense of independent shopkeepers and, in some areas, 
consumer co-operatives. Most multiple retailers still operated on a district or regional 
basis, but the amalgamation of existing enterprises alongside the opening of new 
stores created an increasing number of multi-million-pound businesses trading 
nationally through hundreds of outlets.3 Operations on such a scale, both commercial 
and geographical, confirmed the business potential of the emerging model of multiple 
retailing, but they also raised substantial managerial challenges.4  
 
The success enjoyed by many multiple retailers is commonly linked to the economies 
secured by the growing extent of their trading operations and to the development of 
centralised management systems.5 Multiple retailers bought, or themselves 
produced, consumer goods on a new scale, sourcing the bulk of stock for their entire 
store chain through a single purchasing operation. Working in this way not only 
secured scale economies, but also increased the retailer’s power relative to 
producers. Some multiples began to dictate to external suppliers in matters of design 
and quality, as well as the price that they were willing to pay for goods.6 Moreover, 
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integration and standardisation frequently extended beyond stock acquisition to 
matters such as the appearance, layout and equipment of stores.7 This enabled 
further economies in the purchasing of fixtures and fittings, and time and cost savings 
when building or refurbishing stores. But store design was also key to the 
development of a widely-recognised brand image. Multiple retailers thus presented 
their stores as reassuringly familiar spaces that consumers could enter with 
confidence, knowing that they would find the goods which they wanted to buy at 
prices they could afford to pay.8 The most successful multiple retailers were thus 
marked by their astuteness in judging which goods would most appeal to consumers 
and how they could best be displayed. Many also invested considerable effort in 
identifying store locations which would maximise passing trade and in securing the 
necessary finance to obtain these prime sites.9 
 
Accounts of the rise of multiple retailing in general, and of individual concerns, thus 
frequently stress the strong control exercised by central management; sometimes, 
indeed, by a single owner or owning family.10 The leadership of Simon Marks and 
Israel Sieff, for example, is widely acknowledged as vital to the interwar development 
of Marks and Spencer.11 Amongst their contemporaries, John Sainsbury was 
described by the Grocers’ Gazette as ‘an unapologetic dictator’; whilst Montague 
Burton exercised near absolute authority over the tailoring chain which bore his 
name.12 More generally it was the case that important decision-making powers 
regarding product lines, stock purchasing, staffing, store development, design and 
layout were reserved for a small and often self-perpetuating group of directors and 
head office managers. In a turn towards Taylorism operational procedures at the 
level of the individual stores seem often to have been centrally determined and 
documented for faithful replication throughout a company’s entire chain. Local 
managers, moreover, were required to submit increasingly frequent and detailed 
written reports on the trading performance of their stores. Further to ensure that local 
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practice matched the expectations of head office, managers and their stores were 
also subject to the oversight of a growing army of visiting inspectors and 
supervisors.13 
 
In the United States Woolworth’s produced rules for the conduct of its stores at least 
as early as 1892, and imported this managerial ethos on arrival in Britain in 1909.14 
Sainsbury’s published its first rule book for branch managers in 1914, and a head 
office circular of 1916 is taken to mark an equivalent stage in the efforts of Curry’s, 
the bicycle and electrical retailer, to unify its expanding chain of stores.15 Although 
different in detail these documents covered similar ground, defining matters such as 
store opening hours and standards of staff dress and behaviour, but also setting out 
expectations about display, stock control and the monitoring of sales to maximise 
income from the fastest selling and most profitable lines. It is striking, however, that 
we know more about the existence of these systems and rules than about their 
application in practice, or about the branch managers whose working lives they 
shaped. 
 
The branch store manager has not attracted particular attention from retail 
historians.16 Nor are they necessarily well represented in larger studies of the 
evolution of managerial systems; including Chandler’s influential work on Sears in the 
United States, which concentrates on the relationship between head office and 
executives overseeing groups of stores at the regional or district level.17 What little 
we know of the selection of store managers in interwar Britain often to reinforces their 
image as subordinate figures, working within a system in which ‘the brains’ were 
‘supplied from headquarters with the consignment of goods’.18 We are told, for 
example, that multiple retailers were often wary of recruiting the most educated or 
ambitious individuals, preferring to appoint trainee managers directly from secondary 
school, or to promote existing employees already familiar with the company’s 
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practices and philosophy. Promotion was, moreover, as likely to have been a 
reflection of administrative competence in record-keeping and other routine tasks, as 
of any demonstration of commercial flair or capacity for leadership. Thus whilst ideal 
candidates were honest, reliable and efficient, they were also conformist and 
ultimately limited in their ambitions.19 It unsurprising, therefore, that the glimpses that 
we catch of store managers elsewhere are often unflattering. Some appear rather 
downtrodden, subject to constant head office pressure to boost sales, reduce costs 
and eliminate waste, yet poorly paid given the scale of their responsibilities for stock 
and weekly sales often worth hundreds, or even thousands, of pounds.20 Others are 
portrayed as bullies, unfairly pressurising their staff in response to the performance 
pressures which they themselves felt; or, for similar reasons, as over-zealous in their 
pursuit of suspected shoplifters.21 Critics, not least independent retailers and their 
champions, also condemned chain store managers as company men, concerned 
more with ‘sending big cheques’ to head office, than with their responsibilities – civic 
as well as commercial – to their own local community.22 Yet from their earliest days 
there was also a case to be made that multiple retailers’ success was ‘due not merely 
to the brainy organization at headquarters, but likewise to the efficient managers who 
control the branches’.23 
 
The managerial structures of multiple retailers have sometimes been likened to those 
which had previously developed on the railways to co-ordinate a geographically 
dispersed workforce; in turn echoing a military hierarchy of command.24 But such 
parallels are revealing in that they do not necessarily imply the absolute 
centralisation of management. Early railway companies are best understood to have 
had a cellular, rather than a unitary structure. Within each cell – a goods depot, a 
station, a signal box – there was scope for individual employees to interpret and 
implement company practice in their own way. Moreover, these differences of 
interpretation were not simply a product of minor acts of rebellion, or of the varying 
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commitment and capabilities of individual workers; they also reflected company 
expectations that staff would display discretion where necessary to ensure that rules 
and regulations were intelligently applied in ways that were locally appropriate.25 
Multiple retailers had, by definition, a similarly cellular structure, potentially conferring 
a degree of freedom on managers and their staff in the day-to-day running of 
individual stores. This is acknowledged by Raucher in his exploration of managerial 
practice in North American chain stores.26 Walsh, too, offers some insights into 
Woolworth’s expectations of its British store managers, although her account chiefly 
stresses the discipline imposed by the company’s operational procedures and 
training programme for managerial recruits.27 But otherwise there is little historical 
research which explores managerial discretion and its impact, both positive and 
negative, on company performance.  
 
The following discussion examines evidence from the British variety store chain 
Marks and Spencer to confirm that, in some cases at least, the organisational 
structure of interwar multiple retailing was one in which local managers were 
expected to play an intelligent part, and in which individuals were as likely to be 
criticised for a failure to show the expected degree of initiative, as for any 
unwarranted assertion of independence.  
 
Marks and Spencer: changes and challenges during the interwar years 
The interwar years were a critical time for Marks and Spencer, during which the 
company overcame the enforced abandonment of its initial penny bazaar format to 
transform itself into one of Britain’s leading retailers. The outlines of this process are 
well-known, including the American inspiration for many of the company’s advances 
in scientific management, its investment in larger stores, the emphasis on selling 
clothes and textiles enabled by the new fixed maximum retail price of 5s., and the 
importance of partnership with suppliers in improving the quality and value of Marks 
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and Spencer’s goods.28 These innovations are rightly identified as a product of the 
central leadership provided by Chairman Simon Marks and Israel Sieff, his closest 
associate amongst the company’s directors, who were personally involved in almost 
every aspect of management.29 But transformation of the company’s fortunes also 
required significant changes in the management and staffing of individual stores.  
 
As penny bazaars, Marks and Spencer branches had invariably been overseen by a 
manageress – perhaps with a designated deputy – who undertook all supervisory 
and administrative work, including control of the stockroom.30 Other staffing was 
limited to female sales assistants with, in some instances, a male porter to undertake 
heavy work. This model remained unchanged in some smaller stores until well into 
the 1930s, but was quickly superseded elsewhere as the company’s development 
programme created a growing number of ‘superstores’.31 These were substantially 
larger than existing outlets; even the smallest new premises built during the later 
1930s had a sales floor that was nearly twice the size of the largest branch in 1920.32 
Sales, meanwhile, grew faster still (Table 1). Larger and busier stores necessarily 
employed more staff; by the late 1920s branches in major cities sometimes had over 
200 employees.33 Even small stores in provincial towns such as Ilkeston, Keighley 
and Newbury employed at least 40 female sales assistants.34 Staff also began to 
assume more specialist roles; as stockroom assistants, window dressers, cashiers 
and office workers, as well as on the sales floor. Greater scale and complexity in turn 
required new supervisory positions within stores. Experienced sales assistants were 
appointed as floorwalkers to oversee the routine operation of particular sales 
counters. Others became staff floorwalkers responsible for discipline and welfare; a 
function reinforced with the appointment of formally-trained staff manageresses from 
the mid-1930s onwards. Leadership for this growing team was provided by a store 
manager, supported by a deputy and, in the largest stores, a series of departmental 
managers responsible for particular lines of trade, who were usually younger 
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management trainees. This increasing local support for store managers was not, 
however, simply a reflection of the growing scale of individual branches. 
Implementation of the company’s vision required active and intelligent decision-
making by the managers of stores of all sizes to ensure that stock ordering reflected 
the specifics of demand in particular communities; that efficient systems of stock 
control were in place; and that best use was made of staff and space within the store 
to minimise costs and maximise sales. 
 
Table 1: Growth in annual sales by Marks and Spencer stores 1919-20 to 1938-39 
 
Annual sales per 
store 
Number of 
stores 1919-20 
Number of 
stores 1931-32 
Number of stores 
1938-39 
£500,000+ - - 2 
£250,000‒499,999 - 1 10 
£100,000‒249,999 - 11 68 
£50,000‒99,999 - 44 107 
£10,000‒49,999 - 65 49 
£5,000‒9,999 24 12 - 
Less than £5,000 126 11 - 
 
(Source: Calculated from Marks and Spencer Store Trading and Profit and Loss 
Accounts for the years ending March 1920, March 1932 and March 1939 [M&S 
Archive HO/9/1/1/1; HO/9/1/1/7; HO/9/1/1/9]) 
 
New stores thus acquired new managers; a development which, in the chauvinistic 
climate of the times, saw men replace women. This aligned Marks and Spencer with 
other major multiple retailers, including Woolworth’s which had employed male 
managers from its arrival in Britain.35 Some of the first generation of store managers 
had previously been employed in clerical positions in Marks and Spencer’s offices 
and warehouses, but most were externally recruited.36 A few arrived with retail 
experience, former Woolworth’s employees amongst them, but others had started 
their careers as bank clerks, or in the offices of stockbrokers, accountants, shipping 
companies and export traders.37 Most were in their twenties or early thirties – 
including a handful with a university education – and this was the age group, rather 
than school leavers, which Marks and Spencer continued to target as management 
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trainees.38 After the initial wave of appointments the recruitment process for 
managers became more organised. By the early 1930s the company had formalised 
a training programme typically lasting at least 18 months, which took the recruit from 
first experience of handling goods in the stockroom, to the sales floor, and on to 
explore ordering, stock control, staff welfare and financial record-keeping to qualify 
him for appointment as an assistant manager.39 By this stage, too, Sieff could claim 
that ‘labour turnover in the stores managerial staff is negligible’.40 This did not, 
however, indicate that a manager’s tenure in any particular post was necessarily a 
long one. Transfer between stores, sometimes several times a year, was common 
during training and the early stages of an individual’s managerial career.41 In part this 
was designed to ensure that managers gained experience of working in different 
stores, and that their mobility reinforced the consistency of the company’s working 
practices. But the frequency of managerial transfers also reflected the shortage of 
experienced men at a time when Marks and Spencer was growing rapidly.  
 
Transfers usually entailed promotion to a larger store, with a corresponding increase 
in pay. Average weekly pay for store managers rose from £7-3-9 in October 1932 to 
£10-17-6 by July 1937.42 This advance was appreciably faster than for any other 
grade of store staff, partly reflecting the growing scale of individual stores and the 
attendant increase in managerial responsibilities. It is not possible, however, to 
establish any more exact link between managerial pay and store size or 
performance, as surviving personnel records remain closed. Some store managers 
achieved further promotion to the ranks of district supervisors, overseeing a group of 
ten or so stores.43 But opportunities for transfer to head office in London were fewer; 
only a handful of individuals were appointed, from the late 1920s onwards, to posts in 
buying and merchandising, and in the Organization Department overseeing retail 
operations across the country.44 Nor did Marks and Spencer match the meritocratic 
recruitment of the most senior management which Walsh notes at Woolworth’s.45 Not 
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until 1954 did Jan Lewando, who had worked for the company since 1929, become 
the first former store manager to be appointed to Marks and Spencer’s board of 
directors.46 
 
In parallel with changes at store level Marks and Spencer also overhauled its 
managerial structures at head office. The detail of these developments is beyond the 
scope of the present paper, but it should be noted that the company maintained the 
principle that store managers were directly responsible to head office.47 Although 
groups of stores were overseen by district supervisors, there was no significant 
administrative infrastructure at a district or regional level as established by 
Woolworth’s.48 The task of fostering a common understanding of retail management 
amongst the rather disparate group of individuals to whom it had entrusted its stores 
thus fell chiefly to the Organization Department established at head office by Sieff in 
1926.49 District supervisors functioned as the field agents of this department, 
reinforcing its pursuit of sales growth and operational efficiency. Supervisors’ exact 
duties and the territories for which they were responsible evolved as the business 
expanded, until comprehensive reorganisation in 1938 when the company created a 
series of regional divisions, each overseen by a Superintendent, who directed the 
continuing work of district supervisors.50 The consistent expectation, however, was 
that the latter would act both as mentors to store managers and enforcers of the 
company’s managerial principles, reporting to head office on their weekly visits to the 
branches under their charge.51 During these visits supervisors would typically review 
sales and expenditure, inspect the stockroom and discuss the manager’s planned 
stock purchases. A more forensic review of store accounts and stockholdings was 
also undertaken several times a year by a peripatetic staff of specialist accountants 
and stocktakers reporting directly to head office. Supervisors thus had an important 
role in shaping local managerial practice, but, as later discussion will confirm, their 
authority was not absolute. 
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The task of fleshing out the specifics of change in managerial practice at the level of 
the individual store is complicated by the limitations of the available evidence. In 
common with many other retail companies the Marks and Spencer Archive chiefly 
contains head office records which offer few insights into how working practices were 
regarded by managers and other staff employed at store level. Moreover, key 
documents, including minutes of the meetings of the board of directors are closed to 
researchers. Some valuable light is, however, shed on relations between head office, 
district supervisors and branch managers by a series of Management Bulletins. 
Produced by the Organization Department, the Bulletins were issued weekly from 
June 1927 until January 1928, and thereafter at a rate of between one and three 
issues per month until February 1930.52 It is unclear why publication became less 
frequent and ultimately ceased, but it is likely that the Organization Department 
became increasingly committed to oversight of the store development programme. 
Initially the Bulletins were distributed only to managers of larger stores, but from 
autumn 1927 circulation was extended to all branches.53 Copies of over sixty issues 
survive, all of which have been consulted for the present research, covering the 
aftermath of public floatation in 1926, during which the company laid many of the 
foundations of its future success. 
 
Unlike later staff magazines, which had a promotional and welfare function, the 
Bulletins were concerned with the specifics of store management.54 Whilst they were 
intended to inspire confidence amongst managers in the potential for profitable 
expansion, the Bulletins were also clear that this bright future could be endangered 
by a lack of adequately skilled store managers.55 It was vital, therefore, that 
individuals study and act upon the instructions which the Bulletins contained, seeking 
amplification as necessary from their district supervisor. ‘No manager’, warned an 
early edition, ‘should be satisfied with only a half-baked knowledge of merchandising. 
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He must be convinced that he understands the principles about which we have been 
talking and writing’.56 This understanding was to be shared in turn with other staff, 
particularly assistant managers and trainees.57 
 
The perspective of the Bulletins is necessarily rather one-sided; it is very much head 
office speaking to its staff. But the Bulletins are unusual in providing both a statement 
of the managerial principles which store staff were expected to embrace, and a 
commentary – derived chiefly from district supervisors’ reports – on their enactment 
in practice. They serve, therefore, as an important reminder that even in 
organisations which successfully negotiate change, the transition may involve a 
difficult learning process.58 The Bulletins are also revealing in their attention to store 
functions and spaces that are vital to commercial success, but which are sometimes 
neglected by retail historians. In part because of the recent impetus to retail studies 
provided by a growing academic interest in consumption we know rather more about 
change on the sales floor, particularly innovations in display and salesmanship, than 
we do about work undertaken in the delivery bay, the stock room, or the manager’s 
own office. Yet it was often to these latter places and processes that managers were 
urged to pay particular attention. 59 
 
The following sections will first outline the managerial principles which the Bulletins 
were at pains to set out; with a regularity of repetition which suggests that they were 
not immediately understood and enacted by all store managers, or enforced by 
district supervisors. We will then explore the Bulletins’ accompanying commentary on 
local performance, which includes criticism of those who did not meet head office 
expectations. Revealingly such disapproval was directed not just at managers who 
ignored company processes and procedures, but also at anyone – including 
supervisors – who observed them unthinkingly, or who otherwise failed to show the 
expected discretion and initiative. 
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The intelligent store manager 
The Bulletins were important in promulgating the managerial principles which Simon 
Marks had identified as key to the company’s future, at a time when Marks and 
Spencer had not yet established a formal system of staff training.60 In particular, 
Marks’ exposure to US retail methods had inspired a new insistence that stores 
should maximise the earnings potential of every foot of selling and counter space.61 
This implied an active role for individual managers in organising their stores to 
achieve the desired result. A manager was expected to be ‘in hourly touch with his 
departments’, garnering information, not only about total takings, but also demand for 
individual product lines, and garment styles, sizes and colours.62 On this basis he 
was to distinguish between fast- and slow-selling lines, ensuring that the former 
received increased counter space and prominence in displays, whilst relegating the 
latter to less favoured positions. Any item that proved a persistent ‘dud’ was to be 
eliminated altogether.63 The Bulletin thus commended the example of a district 
supervisor who required all his managers to submit a store plan showing takings per 
counter for the previous week, which was reviewed to ensure the most effective use 
of space. In this instance at least such discussion involved the alternative 
arrangement of counter and display space on Fridays and Saturdays when the stores 
were busiest.64 
 
Expectations regarding the reallocation of resources also extended to the 
deployment of sales staff. Managers were instructed to move the most capable 
assistants between departments to reinforce the profit-maximising potential of fast-
selling lines. By contrast, the least competent were to be dismissed.65 The Bulletin 
reminded managers that the Christmas sales period afforded them a particular 
opportunity of judging the efficiency and sales skills of individual assistants. Those 
deemed weakest were subsequently to be ‘weeded out’ and replaced by ‘promising’ 
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girls from amongst the temporary Christmas staff.66 Decisions about the specifics of 
staffing, including hiring and firing, were thus clearly identified as the responsibility of 
the individual store manager. Indeed, sensitivity to criticism that multiples were a 
disruptive external force in the retail economy of many towns encouraged stress to 
be laid on the recruitment of sales assistants from amongst the local unemployed, as 
was evident in press reports of new store developments.67 However, the attention 
that managers were required to pay to the deployment of sales staff also indicates 
the company’s changing expectations of its workforce. 
 
The emphasis on the open display of goods pioneered by Marks and Spencer and 
other variety stores is often taken to imply an increasingly passive role for counter 
staff whose functions are sometimes seen as being confined to wrapping purchases 
and taking payment once customers had made their choice of goods. Indeed, it is 
argued that this contributed to variety stores’ appeal amongst consumers of modest 
means who avoided interaction with sales staff for fear that it would expose 
deficiencies in their taste and spending power.68 The Bulletin, however, indicates that 
Marks and Spencer demanded rather more of its shopfloor staff. The company’s 
strategy of trading up meant that most sales were of items that were individually 
more expensive than had been the case when it operated as a penny bazaar, and 
shoppers would necessarily be more discriminating when making their purchases. 
Sales assistants, therefore, ‘must no longer be mere dummies, wrapping up 
parcels, but must take an intelligent interest in the sale of goods in all departments’.69 
It followed that store managers’ responsibilities extended to the provision of training 
to ensure that assistants were ‘able to talk to the customer about the article and point 
out its virtues in regard to price and quality, and induce her to buy’.70 Managers were 
also urged to take steps to maximise the value of their sales staff as an information 
source regarding consumer tastes, reactions to particular goods and requests for 
items that the store did not sell. They must be trained to record these impressions 
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accurately, perhaps by providing assistants with books in which to note customer 
comments and enquiries.71 
 
A company strategy based on maximising sales also prompted regular attention to 
the techniques of retail display. The Bulletin insisted that prominence in window and 
counter displays should be reserved for the fastest-selling higher-priced items.72 It 
was even suggested that staff might themselves wear featured items of clothing; 
‘Many Managers’, asserted the Bulletin, ‘are now realising that the sales are greatly 
increased by having suitable girls dressed as Mannequins’.73 In other respects, 
however, much of the advice about display was similar to that contained in 
contemporary textbooks and journals circulating elsewhere in the retail trade.74 
Careful planning was required to ensure that displays were regularly renewed; that 
appropriate emphasis was placed on seasonal goods; that displays were 
entertaining, colourful and well lit; and that their impact was not diminished by 
inclusion of a confusing diversity of goods.75 Bulletins also contained lists of those 
goods which were selling fastest nationally, but this rarely translated into a definite 
instruction to feature specific items in store displays.76 Indeed, managers were 
encouraged to plan displays in the light of their own understanding of market 
conditions, for ‘a great deal depends upon the individual peculiarities of the store and 
the district in which the store is located’.77 Managers were also regularly encouraged 
to display goods that could be linked to current performances at local theatres and 
cinemas.78 
 
Effective selling was, however, understood to require equally careful attention to 
stock purchasing, storage and control. Much of Marks and Spencer’s interwar 
success followed from the partnerships developed with favoured suppliers which 
produced goods in bulk, not only at highly competitive prices, but increasingly also to 
the retailer’s own specifications.79 The range of available goods was in turn 
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presented to branch managers as an approved list, or ‘catalogue’, from which they 
must select when submitting their stock order to head office.80 This was a key area in 
which managers were empowered to exercise a degree of discretion. As well as 
consulting the Bulletin for information about fast-selling lines, the manager was 
expected to have an exact understanding of the colours, sizes and styles of goods 
that sold best in his particular locality, and so order those ‘lines which, in his 
experience as well as ours, merit counter space’.81 In determining their orders 
managers were instructed to use information from records of past sales, and to take 
account of both the seasonal rhythms of trade and specific local events and festivities 
which might affect business at their store.82 Given the speed and regularity with 
which many managers moved between stores, they must, however, often have been 
reliant on other longer-serving staff for such local intelligence.  
 
Managers were thus required to enact the principles of what the Bulletin dubbed 
‘intelligent ordering’, taking timely action to ensure that their store held adequate 
stocks of items known to be in demand, but equally that there was no accumulation 
of unsold or unsaleable stock. Indeed the degree to which Marks and Spencer also 
highlighted improvements in standards of stock control and storage provides an 
instructive contrast to academic studies which have often focused on the public face 
which shops presented to their customers. Even press descriptions of newly-built 
stores aimed at shoppers stressed not only the attractions of the sales area, but also 
the scale of stock storage space and the company’s investment in electric hoists, lifts 
and transporters to ensure the fast and efficient transfer of goods from delivery dock 
to stock room to sales floor.83 This is mirrored in the importance attached by the 
Bulletin to good management to prevent loss of sales through lack of stock, reduce 
damage through poor storage and minimise the costly accumulation of surplus stock. 
Managers must review stock holdings regularly; there must be no unnecessary 
delays in transferring goods to the sales floor; and stock room space must be 
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allocated in an ordered and logical fashion to different categories of goods, mirroring 
the departmental structure of the store.84 
 
Effective management was thus seen to require detailed information about retail 
sales, stock purchasing and stock holding. Record-keeping was important not only in 
informing managerial decisions at a local level, but also for head office both in 
judging the performance of individual stores and in longer-term development 
planning. The transformation of Marks and Spencer’s reporting system was central to 
the company’s pursuit of growth and operational efficiency. The company had first 
required weekly reports from its store managers as early as 1909; the interwar years, 
however, saw demands for new levels of detail and precision.85 Managers were 
expected not simply to record total sales, but also to specify the performance of each 
department within their store, along with a comparative statement of the previous 
week’s takings and those for the equivalent week in the previous year. Performance 
was also judged relative to the counter footage and staff employed to achieve it.86 In 
addition the company introduced a parallel series of weekly merchandise reports, 
requiring managers to account for any significant changes in sales; identify the 
fastest selling lines; report on the performance of any new lines; note which goods 
had featured in store displays and other promotional initiatives; record stockholdings 
of fast-selling lines and any delays in stock deliveries.87 The information resource 
thus created was used by the company to inform its decision-making at every level. 
Head office, for example, compiled aggregated returns of the total monthly sales of 
each individual item of merchandise to assist in the constant refinement of the 
product range; items which failed to meet a defined sales target were immediately 
listed for temporary suspension or permanent elimination.88 This process of data 
collection and processing thus embodied the company’s ultimate aspiration ‘to 
entirely eliminate guess-work’ from its managerial decision-making ‘and to 
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substitute therefore intelligent anticipation based on known facts and on known 
figures’.89 
 
Expectations and actualities 
The Bulletins constitute an important statement of the managerial systems and ideals 
upon which the successful reinvention of Marks and Spencer as a variety store was 
based. They confirm the primacy of head office in directing retail operations 
throughout the country. District supervisors exerted an important and immediate 
influence over the work of store managers, but the latter were themselves the 
recipients of a constant stream of information and instruction directly from head 
office, and were required to submit their own regular and detailed reports in return. 
Clear, too, is the stress placed on local managerial discretion to ensure that standard 
processes and product portfolios were fine tuned to reflect the circumstances and 
spending habits of particular communities. The Bulletins are of further interest, 
however, for what they reveal about the actuality of local managerial practice. In an 
era when personnel management worked to rules rather different from those of 
today, the Bulletins provided a blunt commentary on the behaviour of employees who 
were unwilling or unable to adopt the required approach to store management. Such 
criticism highlights the extent of the transformation of retail practice that Marks and 
Spencer was enacting. This went far beyond the changes evident to consumers in 
the scale and appearance of stores, and the range of goods sold. Stock and sales 
records took on a new importance as planning tools. Whereas managers had 
previously paid only limited attention to the details of stock control they were now 
expected to apply the principles of intelligent ordering, and to ensure that their stock 
rooms were organised with as much care as the sales floor.90 No longer was it the 
case that stores would order items in an unspecified mixture of sizes and colours and 
‘the manufacturers sent what they liked’.91 Improved logistics and growing sales of 
fashion goods further transformed the functions of ordering and stock control. 
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Managers accustomed to accumulating stock as insurance against the slow delivery 
of supplies were warned that it was wasteful and unnecessary to carry more than 
three weeks’ worth of goods. Such innovation and standardisation in managerial 
practices are frequently held to have contributed significantly to the expansion of 
multiple retailing during the early-twentieth century. The Bulletins offer new insights 
into the process of learning which this entailed. 
 
Although individuals were never named, the Bulletin regularly reported observed 
failings in local practice which reflected almost every aspect of the store manager’s 
role. This is evidence of both the in-store presence of district supervisors as the eyes 
of head office, but also of the initial limitations of the supervisory system in ensuring 
that managerial principles and practice were always aligned. Managers were 
criticised for mounting dull displays, for featuring ill-chosen goods, for delays in 
displaying seasonal goods, for failing to monitor the impact of displays on sales, and 
for carrying insufficient stocks of the items chosen for display.92 Others were guilty of 
excessive enthusiasm in mounting displays that used too much stock, which was 
rendered unsaleable, or which damaged fixtures and fittings.93 Local failures of 
personnel management were similarly highlighted as a warning to others. Particular 
attention was expected to the in-store training of assistant managers, not least to 
inculcate the principles of intelligent ordering. Such training was ‘farcical’, asserted 
the Bulletin, if it ignored ‘one of the most important functions in the store’. Any 
managers who were ‘delinquent’ in this respect were ordered ‘to remedy this 
weakness immediately’.94 Further action was sometimes needed to address 
problems revealed by store visits where sales were being lost because counter staff 
lacked knowledge or confidence in dealing with customers.95 Managers were also 
reminded of the need to attend to staffing levels. Ill-planned deployment of sales 
assistants between departments, or delays in dismissing temporary Christmas staff 
prompted charges that stores were incurring unnecessary labour costs.96 
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Especial criticism was, however, reserved for behaviour deemed to compromise the 
company’s commitment to scientific management. Inadequate and inaccurate 
completion of the required weekly reports was a particular concern. The Bulletin 
bemoaned this apparent evidence that some store managers had not grasped the 
importance of commercial intelligence in informing their own decision-making and 
that of head office.97 Indeed, failure in this respect was often regarded as 
symptomatic of wider inadequacies, which themselves generated immediate costs. 
Too often, it was claimed, stores fell at the first hurdle, appearing ‘very lax and slip-
shod’ in their arrangements for receiving goods.98 This led to losses if unrecorded 
stock was not promptly placed on sale, or if goods were later found to be imperfect 
and could not be returned to the supplier. Relations with suppliers could, moreover, 
be damaged if poor practice in stores led to unjustified complaints about delivery 
deficiencies and delays.99 Disorganisation in the stock room caused further ‘futile 
waste’ if goods became soiled or faded, if excessive staff time was required to locate 
items, or if the misplacement of stock meant that unnecessary replacements had to 
be ordered.100 Such failings perpetuated ‘rank bad ordering’ without reference to 
accurate figures for sales or stock-in-hand.101  
 
Managers were also rebuked for a continuing tendency to order equal quantities of all 
sizes and colours of particular clothing lines, ignoring patterns of local demand 
revealed by their own previous sales, and increasing the risk of creating unsaleable 
surpluses of less popular goods.102 Some, moreover, appear to have misinterpreted 
the function of the company’s stock catalogue. It was not the intention, the Bulletin 
stressed, that all branches should carry every product line. Intelligent ordering 
required that managers select a range of goods that was proportional to their 
available counter space; it was ‘bad merchandising’ to attempt to carry the same 
range of stock in small stores as in their larger counterparts.103 Indeed, the Bulletin’s 
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strictures sometimes extended to supervisors, who were warned not to encourage 
the managers of smaller branches to stock an inappropriate range of goods.104 
 
Equally serious was evidence that stores were selling goods obtained from 
unauthorised sources. As a warning to others the Bulletin reported the case of a 
store found to be displaying shirts that were ‘in conflict with all cannons of good 
taste’. The appearance of such ‘substandard’ lines was not only a challenge to the 
authority of head office, but also a threat to the new trading model which emphasised 
the guaranteed quality of the company’s goods. ‘Our business’, concluded the 
Bulletin, ‘will never make the headway it should do if our Managers try to push lines 
that have never been selected or ordered’ by head office buyers.105 Yet contrary to 
instructions some managers continued to deal directly ‘with local Manufacturers and 
have had goods delivered to them and actually paid the manufacturers in cash for 
these goods’.106 
 
The Bulletin’s concerns about ordering and stock control also reflected a perception 
that some store managers were adapting too slowly to wider changes in market 
conditions. Falling retail prices during a period of sustained deflation and the 
extension of notions of fashion to a widening array of clothing, footwear and other 
goods increased the need to dispose of stock swiftly.107 Moreover, the partnerships 
which Marks and Spencer forged with manufacturers created a particular impetus for 
product innovation; with improved lines becoming available ‘almost monthly’ outdated 
stock could only be sold at a discount.108 Managers were therefore reminded that the 
sourcing of goods directly from trusted British suppliers, together with logistical 
innovations, had significantly reduced delivery times. Only in exceptional cases was it 
now necessary to carry stock for more than three weeks ahead; yet too many 
managers persisted in accumulating six to eight weeks’ stock of dry goods. Such 
‘hoarding’, the Bulletin warned, ‘is not merchandising – it is gambling, and no 
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successful business can be built upon this principle’.109 To reinforce this argument 
managers were reminded that the losses caused when price reductions were 
necessary to dispose of soiled or surplus stock, and the opportunity costs created by 
the unprofitable use of capital and storage space could together amount to an annual 
charge to the company of at least £60 for every £1,000 of overstock. 110 
 
Instances of unauthorised managerial behaviour did not, however, always reflect 
what the Bulletin regarded as local resistance to change. Perversely, some appear to 
have been inspired by the pressure felt by managers to meet the company’s 
increasingly exacting performance standards.111 Thus the Bulletin’s allegation that it 
‘has become a habit with certain Managers to give false stock figures’ in their weekly 
returns reflected concerns not just about ‘slovenliness of work’, but also more 
calculated behaviour.112 Some store managers appear to have deliberately 
understated current holdings in their weekly reports, with the aim of accumulating 
substantial stocks of seasonal goods ahead of demand. The individuals concerned 
were evidently anxious that accurate returns would result in the scale of their orders 
being reduced, leaving them short of stock to meet any surge in sales and open to 
censure for failing to maximise the earnings potential of their store. In response the 
Bulletin again stressed the financial risks that such behaviour might generate, urging 
direct consultation with head office – interestingly, with no mention of the supervisor 
as a potentially intermediary – as an alternative means of addressing the challenge 
‘without having to carry a large and unhealthy stock’.113 
 
Capability and compliance: a delicate balance 
In concluding we should recall that the evidence discussed above is the product of a 
particular context. During, and indeed for some time after, the interwar years Marks 
and Spencer was controlled by directors drawn from a small number of inter-related 
families. This partly explains the emphasis on direct communication between head 
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office and branch stores, and the limitations of management at a regional level 
compared with Woolworth’s and some other nationally-operating multiple retailers.  
 
Secondly, Marks and Spencer was a business in transition; during the 1920s and 
1930s staff working at all levels faced challenges created by larger stores, a more 
extensive branch network, and the sourcing and sale of a changing product range. 
Individuals were thus required to learn to work in new ways. Initially at least some 
branch managers seem to have been unable – or unwilling – to implement the 
necessary changes, not least in the balance to be struck between conformity and 
local discretion in the running of their own stores. But head office, too, was still 
exploring how best to manage a growing network of stores, increasingly diverse in 
scale and serving communities which varied in size and prosperity.  
 
It follows that there was a gradual refinement – sometimes responding to specific 
problems – of managerial systems intended to promote a more exact and scientific 
approach to ordering, stock control, sales and costs. An instance of over-purchasing 
of seasonal goods at seaside branches was, for example, the immediate trigger to 
new documentation for stock checking subsequently adopted in all the company’s 
stores.114 Gradually, too, some of the tensions and disparities between managerial 
principles and practice were resolved as what had once been a radical break with 
established methods of ordering and stock control became routine. At the same time 
the company built up a cadre of experienced store managers, whose transfer across 
the branch network played an important part in reinforcing standard practices. 
 
The specifics of Marks and Spencer’s management were also a function of its 
adoption of the variety store format. The range of good sold was defined by price, 
rather than any pre-determined line of business. This offered considerable scope for 
growth in sales and profits, but also created particular managerial challenges. It was 
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vital to understand and, if possible, anticipate emerging patterns of consumer 
demand; to source and deliver goods promptly; and to demonstrate equal efficiency 
in-store to maximise sales before fashions and the public mood changed. This 
business model was the source of many of the Bulletin’s preoccupations regarding 
monitoring of sales, intelligent ordering, stock control and the deployment of store 
space and staff.  
 
The extent to which equivalent pressures were felt by other multiple retailers varied. 
The interwar decades saw fashion exert a growing influence on trades including 
clothing, footwear and furnishing. Moreover, major multiple chemists, principally 
Boots and Timothy White’s, were starting to rival the variety stores in the range of 
their stock. Other companies, too, succeeded through diversification; the cycle 
retailer Curry’s, for example, increasingly sold toys, prams, radios and other electrical 
items.115 But some amongst the many multiples which supplied apparently stable 
markets for foodstuffs and other basic household goods also felt the need to review 
their managerial systems. Sometimes, as was true of the Allied Suppliers group of 
grocery businesses – including the Home and Colonial Stores and Lipton’s – change 
was prompted by faltering sales and a consequent need to secure higher and more 
consistent standards of operational efficiency. But whilst overhauling branch 
management during the mid-1930s the group emphasised not only staff training in 
approved procedures and central monitoring of the performance of individual stores, 
but also the need to recruit and reward managers capable of showing the necessary 
initiative to translate standard practice into local success.116 Trading difficulties during 
the depression years also prompted W H Smith, the newsagent and bookseller, to 
revise the criteria for the recruitment and promotion of its store managers, placing 
increasing stress on aptitude for business development, rather than simply clerical 
competence.117 
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Evidently, therefore, Marks and Spencer was not alone amongst interwar multiples in 
placing more emphasis on the initiative, abilities and character of individual branch 
store managers than is sometimes credited. It was not the case that every detail of 
local practice was dictated by head office, or that a new era of mass production 
created an array of goods so desirable as to effectively sell themselves. As the 
Bulletin argued the ‘atmosphere of a store is created by the Manager’; it was his, or 
her, enthusiasm, attention to detail in ordering, stock control and display, skill in 
dealing with staff and customers, and knowledge of local market conditions that 
made the difference between a ‘stale’ and a ‘sparkling’ store.118 This is not to ignore 
the extent or significance of standardised systems of accounting, ordering and 
delivery, company expectations about display and stock control, and the visual 
impact of consistency in store design, fixtures and fittings. Such efforts were intended 
not only to raise commercial standards and create new efficiencies, but also, the 
company argued, to make the individual manager’s task easier. Those who failed to 
heed this message could hardly expect to enjoy a successful career with Marks and 
Spencer. But the Bulletin was equally clear that ‘a considerable amount of discretion’ 
was still given to branch managers in the specifics of the selection and ordering of 
stock, in the local hiring of staff and in the organisation of the store to maximise sales 
and minimise waste.119 It followed that those who showed too little initiative; who 
were too reliant on direction by visiting supervisors; who failed to understand the 
principles of intelligent ordering; or who proved incapable of using local resources to 
best advantage, were as unwanted by head office as were ‘delinquent’ managers 
who bought goods from unauthorised sources, knowingly submitted false weekly 
returns or deliberately hoarded stock.120  
 
The commentary on the realities of local practice provided by the Bulletin can 
sometimes appear overly censorious and it is impossible to judge the number of 
store managers who acted in ways of which supervisors and head office 
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disapproved. The frequency with which the Bulletin restates the company’s 
managerial principles does, however, suggest that transgression was not limited to 
isolated instances; in practice branch stores were not always the flawlessly efficient 
operations that abstract discussions of multiple retailing often suppose. This, in turn, 
was also a function of what were still relatively unsophisticated mechanisms for co-
ordinating the work of head office and branch stores.  
 
Studies of branch managers working for today’s supermarkets often comment on the 
erosion of the entrepreneurial aspects of the role, as store performance is 
increasingly subject to constant and real-time monitoring. Staffing levels and the 
specifics of workers’ tasks are predetermined by head office, meetings run to 
specified templates and ‘computerized schedules, pre-packaged and automatically 
ordered goods, [and] design planograms’ largely dictate store operations.121 This is a 
working environment which contrasts sharply with that found in even the most 
regimented interwar retailers. When almost nothing was automatic, when 
communication between centre and branch took place chiefly by post, or during 
weekly face-to-face meetings between managers and district supervisors, the scope, 
and the need, for local initiative was substantially greater.122 This is reflected in the 
vision of store management promoted by the Bulletin. The ideal store manager was 
thus not the company’s compliant servant, but an active agent; gathering detailed 
data about market conditions, reporting customers’ reactions to particular goods and 
helping to identify new business opportunities. But equally striking is the extent to 
which store managers working for today’s supermarket giants still value those 
remaining decision-making freedoms which their role affords them, whether in people 
management, or in the deployment – sometimes without official sanction – of locally-
situated knowledge to make small adjustments in store layouts and stock orders.123 
Exploration of the balance between direction and discretion thus remains a relevant 
issue in retailing today.  
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